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I. INTRODUCTION1
I met Dale Goble one afternoon toward the end of my first year of law school.
I was studying in the law library when a tall, lanky third year student (Mike) to whom
I had never spoken before tapped my shoulder. Mike explained that he was
graduating that spring, that he had been working as Dale Goble’s research assistant,
and that Dale had tasked him with finding his own replacement. Mike asked me
whether I knew who Dale was (I did) and whether I would be interested in working
with him (I was). Mike offered to make introductions and led the way to Dale’s
office. Mike knocked on the closed door. We heard a surly, “Yeah” in response.
Mike opened the door and a slightly wild-haired man surrounded by stacks of
papers and books glared at us over his reading glasses, red pen in hand. Mike
explained why we were there and as Dale realized we were not there to complain
about a lecture or challenge a grade, he visibly relaxed. When Mike told Dale that I
would be a good research assistant because I worked for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”), a small smile replaced the glare. Mike left shortly thereafter. I
stayed and began to get to know Dale. We agreed that I would begin working as
Dale’s research assistant on Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) issues when my second
year of law school began. I looked forward to that collaboration throughout the
summer, and it was one of the highlights of my law school experience.


Carmen Thomas Morse is an attorney with the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Office of
the Solicitor. The views expressed herein are hers alone and do not represent those of the Office of the
Solicitor, the Department of the Interior, or the United States of America. The author thanks Frank
Wilson and Brad Grenham for their feedback on an earlier version of this article.
1.
In a footnote of an earlier paper, I thanked Professor Dale Goble for his guidance. In this
footnote, I wish to thank Professor Goble for everything else: his brilliant, insightful analyses of ESA
issues; his cross disciplinary work bridging and merging legal, policy, and scientific issues; and being an
incredibly kind and generous person with a wonderful sense of humor. I count myself incredibly lucky to
have had the privilege of working with him.
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During the time I worked with Dale (and for many years before and after), he
was interested in all aspects of the ESA.2 One of the topics Dale was following was
the developing case law about a certain phrase contained in the definitions of
threatened species and endangered species in the ESA: a “significant portion of its
range” or “SPR.”3 We had many discussions about SPR case law and its practical
implications for the agencies responsible for listing species under the ESA. This
article continues the thread of our SPR study by providing a brief update on the
current state of the SPR case law and policy, after summarizing the evolution of the
SPR phrase. This article concludes by identifying the apparently settled, the
definitely unsettled, and the seemingly avoidable SPR issues.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF ITS RANGE”
The “significant portion of its range” (“SPR”) phrase was added to the
Endangered Species Act (“Act”) in 1973 to enable the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS” together, the “Listing
Agencies”) to take earlier and more localized preventative action toward species
conservation.4 The SPR phrase laid largely in repose for the next two decades, until
the FWS withdrew its proposal to list the flat-tailed horned lizard in 1997. In
justifying its withdrawal, the FWS cited inconclusive data that the species was
declining, a reduction in threats, and a recent Conservation Agreement designed to
reduce the remaining threats.5 The Defenders of Wildlife challenged the
withdrawal, arguing that threats to the lizard were ongoing and FWS’s reliance on
a newly minted Conservation Agreement was impermissible.6 When the District
Court upheld the FWS decision, Defenders appealed. 7 In its argument before the
Ninth Circuit, Defenders argued that at least four of the five statutory listing factors
were present on private land, and destruction of the lizard’s habitat on private land
would represent an 82% loss in the total amount of available habitat.8 That large a
portion of the lizard’s range, Defenders argued, constituted an SPR, and the threats

2.
A mere tally of the impressive number of books, book chapters, journal articles, book
reviews, and other publications Dale Goble has authored would provide an accounting of the volume of
his prodigious scholarship yet utterly fail to convey the breadth and depth of his insights and analyses
and the lasting impact both he and his body of work have had on a diverse array of academics and
practitioners in multiple fields including law, history, and science.
3.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2018).
4.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 3, 87 Stat. 884 (1973); President
Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Outlining the 1972 Environmental Program (Feb. 8,
1972), http:/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3731.
5.
Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the Flat-Tailed Horned Lizard as Threatened, 62
Fed. Reg. 37,852, 37,859–60 (July 15, 1997).
6.
Defs. of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 97-CV-2330 TW(LSP), 1999 WL 33537981, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
June 14, 1999).
7.
Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
8.
Id. at 1140, 1143.
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to that SPR warranted listing.9 The FWS argued that listing a species as threatened
is equivalent to listing an SPR because the same level of protection results. 10 After
declaring the SPR phrase “puzzling” and its use in the Act “in some tension with
ordinary usage,” the Ninth Circuit rejected both parties’ arguments.11
At that time, the FWS viewed the SPR phrase as clarifying the evidentiary
burden it must meet to determine that a species warrants listing throughout all of
its range.12 Under this “clarification” interpretation, the SPR language rendered a
species eligible for protection under the Act only if the species faced threats in a
portion of its range that were “so severe as to threaten the viability of the species
throughout” all of its range.13 The problem with this interpretation, according to
the Ninth Circuit, was that it conflated the terms “all” and “significant portion” and
thereby rendered the SPR phrase superfluous.14
After the Ninth Circuit’s 2001 decision in the Defenders case, a number of
listing decisions were challenged on SPR grounds. Different courts took different
analytical approaches to evaluating the SPR phrase, and unsurprisingly, came to
different results.15 In 2007, perhaps because the SPR case law was unsettled and
challenges to the agencies’ SPR interpretation continued, the Department of the
Interior Office of the Solicitor (“Solicitor’s Office”) issued an opinion interpreting
the SPR phrase (M-Opinion 37013). The M-Opinion explained that the Secretary has
“broad” but not unlimited “discretion in defining what portion of a range is
significant,” and explained that interpreting SPR as a “substantive standard” would
be harmonious with language in sections 4, 7, and 9 of the ESA.16 This SPR

9.
Id. at 1140–43.
10. See Brief for Bruce Babbit, Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 9956362), 2000 WL 33980128, at *19.
11. Norton, 258 F.3d at 1141; see also Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870 (9th
Cir. 2009).
12. Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Opinion Memorandum M-37013 on The
Meaning of “In Danger of Extinction Throughout All or a Significant Portion of its Range” at 2 (Mar. 16,
2007),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37013_0.pdf
[hereinafter the M-Opinion].
13. Id. at 2.
14. Norton, 258 F.3d at 1141–42.
15. See Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Kempthorne, No. 04-CV-00075-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL
2023477 (D. Ariz. July 12, 2007); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 402 F. Supp. 2d
1198 (D. Or. 2005); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. C-02-5401EDL (N.D. Cal. Mar.
1, 2004); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. 98-934 (RMU/JMF), 2002 WL 1733618, 15 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2002); Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, CA 99-02072 (HHK) (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2001).
16. M-Opinion, supra note 12, at 3, 16, 18.
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interpretation became known as the “substantive” interpretation.17 A few years
later, this interpretation was rejected in three cases and implicated in two others.18
In May 2011, the Solicitor’s Office withdrew its M-Opinion in order “to
facilitate FWS’s review of the SPR phrase and issuance of new guidance.” 19 In
December of that year, the Listing Agencies issued a draft SPR policy explaining that
a portion of a species’ range is “significant” only “if its contribution to the viability
of the species is so important that, without that portion, the species would be in
danger of extinction.”20 The agencies explained that they would consider this draft
SPR policy as “nonbinding guidance.”21
In 2014, the Listing Agencies published a final policy interpreting the SPR
phrase (“Final SPR Policy”).22 Under this policy, the agencies consider a portion of a
species’ range “significant” if “the species is not currently endangered or
threatened throughout all of its range, but the portion’s contribution to the viability
of the species is so important that, without the members in that portion, the species
would be in danger of extinction, or likely to become so in the foreseeable future,
throughout all of its range.”23 In determining whether an SPR is “significant,” the
agencies “ask whether the species would be in danger of extinction or likely to
become so in the foreseeable future without that portion, i.e., if the members of
that portion were not just currently imperiled, but already completely
extirpated.”24 Under the policy, “range” is defined as “the general geographical area
within which that species can be found at the time” of a status determination—a
species’ current range.25 Although the Listing Agencies may consider “lost historical
range” in their species status analysis, it “cannot constitute a significant portion of

17. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, 248 F.Supp.3d 946, 952 (D. Ariz. 2017).
18. FWS’s SPR interpretation was rejected in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d
1207, 1217–22 (D. Mont. 2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, CV-09-00574-PHX-FJM, 2010 WL
3895682, at *4–6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010); and Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, No. 09-cv-01463AP (D. Colo. July 15, 2013). FWS’s SPR interpretation was implicated, but not explicitly rejected in two
cases because the Court found the challenge to the agency’s SPR interpretation mooted by the
withdrawal of the Solicitor’s Opinion. See Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d 191,
210–12 (D.D.C. 2012); National Assoc. of Home Builders v. Salazar, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2011).
19. Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Opinion Memorandum M-37024 on
Withdrawal of M-37013 – The Meaning of “In Danger of Extinction Throughout All or a Significant Portion
of its Range.” (May 4, 2011), http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/.
20. Draft Policy on Interpretation of the Phrase “Significant Portion of Its Range” in the
Endangered Species Act’s Definitions of “Endangered Species” and “Threatened Species”, 76 Fed. Reg.
76,987 (Dec. 9, 2011).
21. Id. at 77,002.
22. Final Policy on Interpretation of the Phrase “Significant Portion of Its Range” in the
Endangered Species Act’s Definitions of “Endangered Species” and “Threatened Species”, 79 Fed. Reg.
37,577 (July 1, 2014) [hereinafter Final SPR Policy].
23. Id. at 37,579.
24. Id. at 37,581.
25. Id. at 37,609. The agencies explained that “range” includes “those areas used throughout
all or part of the species’ life cycle, even if they are not used regularly (e.g., seasonal habitats).” Id.
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a species’ range.”26 With this definition, the Listing Agencies purported to set a
lower significance threshold than contained in the draft SPR policy.27 The agencies
found a lower threshold appropriate because it would “further the conservation
purposes” of the ESA and “more clearly avoid the appearance of similarity” to the
clarification interpretation rejected by the Ninth Circuit.28 The Final SPR Policy failed
to resolve matters or forestall challenges.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF SPR
In the five years since its issuance, the Final SPR Policy has been subjected to
numerous challenges, both facial and as-applied. Three trends have emerged in the
resulting case law; this section describes these trends.29
A. Proper Interpretation of “Significant Portion” Remains Unsettled
In 2017, the District Court of Arizona rejected the three-year-old Final SPR
Policy.30 In Center for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, plaintiffs challenged the FWS’s
2011 finding that listing the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl as a threatened or
endangered species was not warranted.31 Their challenge “center[ed] on the proper
interpretation” of the SPR phrase.32 In its 2011 finding, published shortly before the
draft SPR policy was issued, the FWS found that two population segments of the

26. Id.
27. Id. at 37,579.
28. Final SPR Policy, supra note 22, at 37,579. The agencies also noted that “many
commenters” had requested a lower significance threshold. Id.
29. In all of the cases described in this section, plaintiffs challenged the agency’s status
determination on multiple grounds; it is beyond the scope of this Comment to address all of these
challenges.
30. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, 248 F. Supp. 3d 946, 958 (D. Ariz. 2017).
31. Id. at 949–50.
32. Id. at 952. The FWS’s 2011 determination reversed its 2009 draft 12-month finding that
listing the pygmy-owl within the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion (a DPS) was warranted but precluded by
other higher priority listings. Id. at 953–54. In reaching its 2009 draft finding, the agency applied an SPR
interpretation that a portion of a species’ range is significant if it “is important to the conservation of
the species because it contributes meaningfully to the representation, resiliency, or redundancy of the
species, such that its loss would result in a decrease in the ability to conserve the species.” Id. at 953
(internal quotations omitted). The agency concluded that the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion population of
pygmy-owls was “important for [the] long-term survival” of the species “due to its substantial
contributions to the resiliency, redundancy, and representation of the species” and that loss of the
Sonoran Desert Ecoregion population would mean the loss of “significant ecological, morphological, and
genetic diversity.” Id. at 953–54 (internal quotations omitted). Such loss, the agency stated, would move
the species “toward extinction and decrease the ability to conserve the species.” Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 954 (internal quotations omitted).
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pygmy-owl qualified as distinct population segments (“DPS”), but did not meet the
definitions of either a threatened or an endangered species. 33 The agency also
concluded that the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion did not represent an SPR despite
determining that the ecoregion represented an important portion of both the
western DPS and the species as a whole, and that loss of the ecoregion would
represent a “significant loss of important habitat and genetic diversity” which might
“reduce the viability and potential for long-term survival of the remaining portion
of the DPS.”34 Without the ecoregion, the agency explained, the western DPS “may
lack sufficient resiliency” to withstand “future environmental changes that are
already manifesting themselves within this DPS.”35 The agency concluded, however,
that the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion was not significant because the best available
information did not indicate that “the remaining portion of the Western DPS”
would likely become extinct if pygmy-owls were extirpated from the ecoregion.36
Before evaluating the 2011 not warranted determination, the court reviewed
the Final SPR Policy.37 The court concluded that the agencies’ efforts “to distinguish
the Final SPR Policy from the clarification interpretation rejected by the Ninth
Circuit” were “illusory.”38 The court distilled the Final SPR Policy into three
conditions that must be satisfied before the agencies would consider listing a
species based on threats in an SPR:
(1) the species is neither endangered nor threatened throughout all of its
range,
(2) the portion’s contribution to the viability of the species is so important
that, without the members in that portion, the species would be endangered or
threatened throughout all of its range, and
(3) the species is endangered or threatened in that portion of its range.39
The problem, the court explained, was that it was not possible to
simultaneously satisfy all three of these conditions because satisfaction of the
second two conditions meant that “a species should properly be determined to be
endangered or threatened throughout all of its range.”40 The first condition
“actually ensures that a portion of a species’ range will never be considered
significant based on accurate application of the Final SPR Policy,” which is “far from
ensuring that the ‘significant’ and ‘all’ language of the ESA will retain independent

33. 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List the Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-Owl as Threatened or
Endangered with Critical Habitat, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,855, 61,888–89 (proposed Oct. 5, 2011) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (finding that the western and eastern populations each constitute a DPS).
34. Id. at 61,892–93.
35. Id. at 61,893.
36. Id.
37. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 955–58.
38. Id. at 956.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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meaning.”41 Thus, the court concluded, the agencies’ significance definition
“render[ed] the SPR phrase superfluous by limiting it to situations in which it is
unnecessary.”42 The court held the FWS “applied an impermissible construction of
the ESA’s SPR language” in finding the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion is not an SPR of
the pygmy owl’s western DPS and vacated and remanded the decision. 43 The court
did not invalidate the Final SPR Policy; the Northern District of California did that
the following year.
At issue before the Northern District of California was the FWS’s status
determination for the bi-state sage-grouse DPS (“sage-grouse DPS”).44 As with the
cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl, the FWS first proposed to list the sage-grouse DPS
as a threatened species, and two years later, withdrew that proposal.45 In its
withdrawal, the agency found that the sage-grouse DPS was stable, and while the
potential threats to the sage-grouse DPS “have the potential to act together to
negatively affect” the DPS, “completed, ongoing[,] and planned conservation
actions have reduced the scope and severity of these impacts.” 46 In conducting its
SPR analysis, the FWS found that three of the six population management units
(“Population Units”) were more vulnerable to threats, but not to the degree that
the entire DPS was “likely to become an endangered species in the foreseeable
future”—even if one of the Population Units was extirpated. 47 Although the
available information “may lead some to believe” that the three vulnerable
Population Units were “at risk of becoming endangered in the foreseeable future,”
the agency explained, “substantial” conservation efforts were being applied to
those three Population Units and were targeting the largest threats to them. 48 The
agency expected these conservation efforts to “[changes] the trajectory” of the
entire DPS from where it “was previously considered to be a threatened species, to
a point where” the DPS did “not meet the definition of a threatened or an
endangered species.”49 As a result, the FWS concluded that listing the DPS was “not

41. Id. at 957.
42. Id. at 958.
43. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 959.
44. Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs), vacated and remanded, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
45. Threatened Status for the Bi-State Distinct Population Segment of Greater Sage-Grouse
with Special Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,358 (proposed Oct. 28, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)
(proposing listing as a threatened species); Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the Bi-State Distinct
Population Segment of Greater Sage-Grouse and Designate Critical Habitat, 80 Fed. Reg. 22,828
(proposed Apr. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (withdrawing 2013 proposed rule).
46. 80 Fed. Reg. at 22,834.
47. Id. at 22,853.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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necessary.”50 Among other things, plaintiffs challenged the agency’s SPR
determination.51
In evaluating the SPR challenge, the Court reviewed the Final SPR Policy and
largely reiterated the Arizona District Court’s analysis in the pygmy-owl case.52 Not
surprisingly, the Northern District of California concluded that the definition of
“significant” described by the Final SPR Policy was an “impermissible interpretation
of the [SPR] language in the ESA.”53 Despite finding the Final SPR Policy invalid, the
Court proceeded to review the application of it in the FWS’s sage-grouse DPS listing
determination.54 The Court found no rational grounds for the agency’s unwarranted
determination and expressed three main criticisms.55
First, the Court criticized the FWS’s reliance on a population modeling study
that concluded that the population of sage-grouse in the DPS as a whole was
stable.56 Such reliance was inconsistent with the agency’s own finding that the
model results “must be interpreted ‘with caution’” because the model “incorrectly
predicted the population trend” in one of the Population Units (Pine Nut) and did
not analyze two others (White Mountains and Mount Grant).57 Second, the agency
“failed to show that there was ‘sufficient certainty’ of effectiveness of future
conservation efforts” by analyzing the likelihood of persistence of the DPS as a
whole, rather than addressing “the likelihood of persistence of each individual
[Population Unit].”58 Without an individualized assessment of each Population
Unit’s persistence, the Court explained the agency “had no basis for relying on that
analysis . . . to reach conclusions about the Pine Nut, White Mountains, and Mount
Grant” Population Units.59 The Court also found the agency’s conclusion
insufficiently supported because it relied on observations of nebulous and
undefined “multiple” sage-grouse in these three Population Units despite
recognizing that each population “may be below the theoretical minimum
threshold . . . for long-term persistence.”60 Indeed, the Court noted, the agency
itself found “the probability of persistence” in these three Population Units
“questionable.”61 Consequently, the Court vacated and remanded the sage-grouse

50. Id. at 22,828.
51. Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
52. Id. at 1073.
53. Id. at 1074.
54. Id. at 1074–76.
55. Id. at 1075.
56. Id. Six Population Units comprise the DPS. 80 Fed. Reg. at 22,830.
57. Desert Survivors, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1045, 1075 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 22,831).
58. Id. at 1075.
59. Id. at 1075.
60. Id. (“[N]othing in the record . . . suggest[s] that ‘multiple’ sage grouse (which could mean
just two) would be above that threshold.” (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 22,838–39)).
61. Id.
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DPS determination.62
This invalidation of the Final SPR Policy placed listing decisions that relied
upon the Final SPR Policy in a bind. The queen conch case is one example.63 After
being petitioned to list the queen conch in 2012, NMFS determined that there was
“substantial information indicating that” listing may be warranted. 64 In 2014, the
agency determined that the species did not warrant listing. 65 In 2016, plaintiffs
challenged that determination on numerous grounds, including its finding that the
queen conch was not threatened or endangered throughout an SPR.66 Plaintiffs
argued that NMFS’s application of the Final SPR Policy was error.67
The agency did not disagree and instead argued that any error it made in
relying on the Final SPR Policy “was harmless in light of the alternative bases for the
significance determination provided in the [listing determination].” 68 In addition to
applying the Final SPR Policy, NMFS argued, it had also applied “a more general
understanding of significance that weighed biological importance to the species as
a whole” and directed the Court to a single sentence in the listing determination. 69
When the Court examined this “general understanding of significance,” however, it
found the single sentence rationale surrounded by text that “plainly” applied the
Final SPR Policy.70 The Court rejected NMFS’s argument as an “impermissible post
hoc rationalization” because it first appeared well after the agency’s 2014 not
warranted determination, in its 2019 notice informing the Court of the Northern
District of California’s Desert Survivors decision.71 The Court vacated and remanded
the agency’s decision.72
With the Final SPR Policy vacated, the proper interpretation of “significant

62. Id. at 1076.
63. See generally Friends of Animals v. Ross, 396 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019).
64. 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the Queen Conch as Threatened or Endangered, 77 Fed.
Reg. 51,763, 51,767 (Aug. 27, 2012).
65. Notice of 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List the Queen Conch as Threatened or
Endangered, 79 Fed. Reg. 65,628, 65,643 (Nov. 5, 2014).
66. Friends of Animals, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 9.
67. Id. at 10; Desert Survivors, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1017–18 (remanding decision to FWS); Desert
Survivors, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (vacating policy). Both sides agreed that NMFS applied the SPR Final
policy. Friends of Animals, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 10.
68. Friends of Animals, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 10.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 10–11. NMFS’s proffered rationale read: “In addition, there is no evidence that
suggests that there is a portion of the species’ range which encompasses aspects that are important to
the species’ specific life history events, where loss of that portion would severally [sic] impact the
growth, reproduction, or survival of the species as a whole.” Id. at 10.
71. Id. The Court also noted that the single sentence explanation was inconsistent with the rest
of the NMFS’ briefing. Friends of Animals, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 14.
72. Id.
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portion” in the SPR phrase remains unsettled. The same may not be true, however,
of the proper interpretation of the term “range” in the SPR phrase.
B. “Range” May be Properly Interpreted to Mean the “Current Range” of a Species
The dispute over the meaning of “range” in the SPR phrase is centered on
whether the term refers to the historical or current range of a species. 73 This dispute
appears to be resolved, as two circuits have recently held that interpreting the term
“range” to mean the current range of a species is reasonable. 74
In Humane Society v. Zinke, the D.C. Circuit employed the traditional rules of
statutory construction to discern the meaning of the term “range” in the SPR
phrase. The Court found that the ESA neither defined the term “range” nor
provided clear context from which it could deduce a definition, and dictionary
definitions also failed to “illuminate the meaning.”75 The Court then considered
whether the FWS’s interpretation of “range” as the “current range” was “based on
a permissible construction of the statute.”76 The Court found this interpretation
permissible because it was consistent with both the use of present tense in ESA
provisions discussing species’ ranges and the use of “current range” in ESA
provisions describing where the Listing Agencies may release experimental
populations.77 The Court also found a “current range” interpretation supported by
the fact that threats impacting a species “where it currently lives often affect its
continued survival the most.”78 The Court concluded that the FWS’s interpretation
of “range” as the “current range” of the gray wolf was reasonable.79
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, the Ninth Circuit came to a similar
conclusion after carefully reviewing the ESA, the Final SPR policy, and its previous
decisions grappling with the meaning of “range” in the SPR phrase. The Court noted
that the “statutory framework of the ESA” provided “at least some support for
interpreting ‘range’ as the current range of a species, although it may not compel
this interpretation.”80 The SPR policy did “not run afoul of the purposes of the ESA,”

73. See generally Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
74. See discussion infra pp. 14–16 (citing Humane Soc’y v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2018)).
75. Humane Soc’y, 865 F.3d at 603–04 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
76. Id. at 605 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
54 (2011)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 603. However, the Court rejected FWS’s conclusion about the current threats to the
species because the agency “categorically excluded the effects of loss of historical range from its
analysis.” Id. The Court described this analytical omission as a “failure to address an important aspect of
the problem,” and noted that FWS will have to address two issues in its future analysis: “[d]efining the
physical boundaries of the relevant historical range” and “[e]stablishing the appropriate timeframe for
measuring a species’ historical range.” Id. at 606–607.
80. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2018).
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the Court determined, because it required the Listing Agencies to “consider the
historical range of a species in evaluating other aspects of the agency’s listing
decision, including habitat degradation” and reduced abundance. 81 Since “the
largest threat to potentially endangered or threatened species is” currently
occupied habitat, the Court explained, it is reasonable for the Listing Agency to
focus on that area of habitat currently occupied by a species when determining
whether the species warrants listing in a significant portion of its range.82 The Court
concluded that the FWS’ interpretation of “range” as the current range of the arctic
grayling was reasonable.83
Thus, the definition of “range” appears to be settling into meaning “current
range” of a species, provided the Listing Agency considers whether a species’
historical range has any effect on a species’ current status or resiliency. Since the
proper interpretation of “significant portion” remains unsettled, listing
determinations will likely turn, perhaps more than ever, on the adequacy of the
rationale supporting the Listing Agency’s determination. The next section provides
three examples of cases in which courts did not reach an SPR interpretation
challenge due to unexplained inconsistencies in the Listing Agency’s analysis or
interpretation of the information underlying its status determination.
C. Unexplained Inconsistencies Result in Remand
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell, plaintiffs challenged the FWS’s withdrawal
of its 2013 proposal to list the wolverine DPS as a threatened species under the
ESA.84 In its withdrawal, the agency explained that “new information and further
analysis” of both new and existing information led it to conclude that the threats
discussed in the proposed listing rule did not place the wolverine at risk of

81. Id. at 1067 (noting that FWS “did consider the arctic grayling’s historical range in evaluating
the factors that contributed to its negative listing decision”).
82. Id.
83. Id. District courts have also affirmed the “current range” interpretation as reasonable. See
Desert Survivors v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Defenders of Wildlife v.
Jewell, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975, 1010 (D. Mont. 2016).
84. Defenders of Wildlife, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 975; see also Threatened Status for the Distinct
Population Segment of the North American Wolverine Occurring in the Contiguous United States, 78
Fed. Reg. 7,864 (proposed Feb. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 70); Threatened Status for the
Distinct Population Segment of the North American Wolverine Occurring in the Contiguous United
States, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,522 (Aug. 13, 2014) (Withdrawal).
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extinction now and were unlikely do so in the foreseeable future.85 Plaintiffs
argued, among other things, that the FWS “unlawfully ignored the best available
science” regarding effects of climate change, genetic isolation, and small population
size, and its application of the Final SPR Policy to the wolverine was invalid.86
In probing the FWS’s analysis of climate change effects on the wolverine, the
Court found that the agency erred when it “impermissibly cast . . . aside” a key study
and essentially demanded “a greater level of scientific certainty than has been
achieved in the field to date.”87 In doing so, the Court explained, the FWS “sought
certainty beyond what is required by the ESA” and its case law when it “demanded
the precise mechanism behind the wolverine’s established need for snow for
reproductive denning purposes.”88 The Court also rejected the agency’s conclusion
that the wolverine was not threatened by its small population size and lack of
genetic diversity because the Court could find no reasonable connection between
the “grim genetic picture for the wolverine” painted by the agency and its
conclusion that the circumstances posed no threat because “there have been no
observed adverse effects” resulting from the lack of genetic diversity.89 As a result,
the Court found error in the agency’s determination that “climate change and
projected spring snow cover” and “small population size and low genetic diversity”
did not threaten the wolverine DPS viability in the foreseeable future.90 The Court
remanded the determination based on these unexplained analytical
inconsistencies.91 Although the Court did not reach plaintiffs’ as-applied SPR
challenge, its remand “compel[ed] the agency to revisit its SPR analysis.”92
The Northern District of California also found error in the FWS’s 12-month
finding that the Pacific coastal marten DPS did not warrant listing.93 In its
determination, the agency acknowledged that “much of the coastal marten’s
historical habitat has been lost,” but concluded that none of the stressors

85. Threatened Status for the Distinct Population Segment of the North American Wolverine
Occurring in the Contiguous United States, 79 Fed. Reg 47,522, 47,545 (Aug. 13, 2014). The FWS
conducted an SPR analysis, “found no portions of the range where potential threats are significantly
concentrated or substantially greater than in other portions of the range” and concluded that “no
portion of the range of the DPS” warranted listing. Id.
86. Defenders of Wildlife, 176 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000.
87. Id. at 1001, 1003.
88. Id. at 1003.
89. Id. at 1006.
90. Id. at 1011.
91. Id. at 1011–12.
92. Defenders of Wildlife, 176 F. Supp. 3d. at 1007. The Court ruled against plaintiffs’ facial
challenge to the Final SPR Policy. Id.
93. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 246 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1286 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
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“individually or cumulatively impact” the DPS “to a degree” warranting listing.94 The
agency concluded that no portion of the DPS’s range constituted an SPR because
“the overall level of stressors [was] not geographically concentrated in one portion”
of the range.95 Plaintiffs argued the FWS erred in concluding the “small and isolated
population effects” did not threaten the DPS viability.96 After reviewing the
information on which the FWS based its determination, the Court found that the
“best available evidence” supported neither the agency’s conclusion that the
California population was stable,97 nor the agency’s conclusion that the three DPS
populations were not functionally isolated.98 While these errors “[did] not mean
that the [FWS] must list the marten as endangered,” the Court explained, it did
mean that the agency “could not have properly weighed” that threat factor against
the other four statutory factors.99 This erroneous conclusion “surely influenced” the
agency’s SPR analysis and resulted in a “flawed” 12-month finding.100
Eighteen months later, the Northern District of California held similarly after
plaintiffs challenged FWS’s withdrawal of its proposal to list the Pacific fisher as a
threatened species.101 In its withdrawal, FWS explained that a “key point” in its
determination was that “the best available data [did] not indicate significant
impacts at either the population or rangewide scales,” despite exposure of the DPS
to multiple stressors over “a decade or more.”102 Plaintiffs challenged the agency’s
withdrawal based on the impacts of three specific stressors: toxicants, population

94. 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List Humboldt Marten as an Endangered or Threatened
Species, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,742, 18,749, 18,768 (proposed Apr. 7, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
The DPS is comprised of three populations located in coastal Northern California, Southern Oregon, and
Central Oregon. Id. at 18,745.
95. Id. at 18,771.
96. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 1277.
97. Id. at 1282 (finding “that the best available evidence support[ed] [FWS’s] conclusions about
the size of the Oregon marten populations, but not the California population”).
98. Id. at 1284–86 (explaining that “[e]ven if [FWS] sufficiently explained away” the other
threats, by “fail[ing] to recognize the California population’s isolation and small and declining numbers,
it could not have properly assessed whether that []population was . . . ‘especially vulnerable to
extirpation.’”)
99. Id. at 1285.
100. Id. at 1285–86.
101. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 342 F. Supp. 3d 968 (N.D. Calif.),
amended in part, 2018 WL 6067546 (N.D. Calif. 2018); see also Threatened Species Status for West Coast
Distinct Population Segment of Fisher, 79 Fed. Reg. 60,419 (proposed Oct. 7, 2014) (to be codified as 50
CFR pt. 17) (proposal to list as threatened); Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the West Coast
Distinct Population Segment of Fisher, 81 Fed. Reg. 22,710 (proposed Apr. 18, 2016) (to be codified as
50 CFR pt. 17) (withdrawal of proposed listing).
102. Withdrawal of the Proposed Rule to List the West Coast Distinct Population Segment of
Fisher, 81 Fed. Reg. at 22,713.
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size, and wildfires.103 In reviewing the FWS’s analysis of the toxicant threat, the
Court found the agency “failed to come to grips with” the findings of a key study
and “cherry picked” the data it contained to best support its not warranted
determination.104 The agency “further erred” in its analysis of the effects of
sublethal toxicants, the Court explained, by “simply retreat[ing] into ‘uncertainty’”
rather than rebutting its previous finding that detrimental effects from sublethal
toxicants were “likely widespread.”105 The Court concluded that uncertainties as to
the degree of toxicant exposure or the effects of such exposure “do not provide the
[agency] a rational connection to its conclusion” that toxicant exposure does not
pose a threat to the DPS.106
The Court also rejected the FWS’s conclusion that population trend studies
indicated a “statistically stable” DPS.107 The population growth measure reported
in two of the three studies indicated only that the population might be stable, the
Court explained, and offering such a measure “as proof of population stability” was
an “’error of logic.’”108 The Court explained that Tucson Herpetological Society
directs that a Listing Agency “may not affirmatively rely on limited and inconclusive
studies (which the [agency] itself recognizes as ‘imperfect’) as evidence of
persistence, and in turn use this ‘evidence’ of persistence as proof that the stressors
pose no threat” to a species.109 The FWS did so here, the Court concluded, and
thereby “failed to make a rational connection between the population trend data
and its conclusion that the Pacific fisher population is stable.” 110 Based on the flaws
in the agency’s analyses of toxicant exposure and population stability, the Court
found remand (and vacatur) “appropriate” and plaintiff’s SPR challenge moot.111
In these cases, the courts compared the rationale supporting a proposed
listing or warranted determination with the Listing Agency’s later rationale
purportedly supporting its determination that listing was not warranted. In each
case, the courts found unexplained analytical inconsistencies and rejected the

103. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 972.
104. Id. at 974.
105. Id. at 975.
106. Id. As the Ninth Circuit held in Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, the Court
directed, the FWS should have explained “why the uncertainty favored delisting instead of some other
course of action, such as conducting further studies to help clarify the impact.” Id. at 976 (citing Greater
Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 655 F.3d. 1015, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011)). “It is not enough for [the
Service] to simply invoke ‘scientific uncertainty’ to justify its action.” Id. (quoting Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2018)).
107. Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 976–77.
108. Id. at 977 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Rauch, 244 F. Supp. 3d 66 (D.D.C. 2017)).
According to the Court, the FWS committed “the very same logical error” in both cases. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 977.
109. Id. at 979 (quoting Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 879 (9th Cir.
2009)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 979–80.
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agency’s “not warranted” determination on that basis. When an agency is
challenged on changing its position on an issue, courts review the rationale
supporting the agency’s new position. In the ESA context, however, the analysis and
interpretation of information underlying Listing Agencies’ determinations have
been receiving increased judicial scrutiny. Listing Agencies should not be unduly
discouraged by the recent spate of remands, however, because courts have upheld
“not warranted” listing determinations when they have found a rational connection
between the determination and the underlying science.112
III. CONCLUSION
When Dale and I first discussed the SPR case law and policy more than a
decade ago, the meaning of SPR did not appear as elusive as it has proved to be.
Almost two decades after SPR litigation began, the “range” of a species appears to
mean its current range, and the proper interpretation of “significant portion”
remains unsettled. Since the Final SPR Policy was vacated in 2018, challenges to
“not warranted” listing determinations have turned on the adequacy of the Listing
Agency’s supporting rationale. Regardless of how the Listing Agencies and courts
ultimately construe “significant portion” in the SPR phrase, it is indisputable that
Dale Goble’s contributions to ESA scholarship are significant—under any definition
of the term.

112. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, No. 3:18-cv-00064-SLG, 2019 WL 4725124 (D.
Alaska Sept. 26, 2019) (affirming the FWS’s determination that the pacific walrus does not warrant listing
under the ESA).

